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ENHANCING CYBERSECURITY IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR BY MEANS OF CIVIL LIABILITY LAWSUITS-
THE CONNIE FRANCIS EFFECT
Jeffrey F. Addicott *
INTRODUCTION
"Getting cyber security right requires new thinking. But certain
principles remain true in cyberspace as they are true about securi-
ty in the physical world."1
-George Osborne
Change is an inevitable component of the human experience,
both for individuals and the businesses that they operate within
society. Sometimes changes in business standards and practices
are brought about simply through the normal course of technical
"evolution,"2 but in other cases changes are brought about as the
result of new laws.3 While the Constitution most certainly envi-
• Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Terrorism Law, St. Mary's Univer-
sity School of Law. B.A., University of Maryland; J.D., University of Alabama School of
Law; LL.M., The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School; LL.M. (1992) and
S.J.D. (1994), University of Virginia School of Law. This article was prepared under the
auspices of the Center for Terrorism Law located at St. Mary's University School of Law,
San Antonio, Texas. The author wishes to acknowledge with special thanks the superb
efforts of Alec T. Dudley, a second-year law student at St. Mary's University School of
Law, who supported this article with outstanding research and editing.
1. Rt. Hon. George Osborne, Chancellor's Speech to GCHQ on Cyber Security (Nov.
17, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellors-speech-to-gchq-on-cyber-
security.
2. The term evolution is not employed to refer to the Darwinian theory that gradual
changes in the physical world are brought about by a process of natural selection and mu-
tations. Evolution here refers to the workings of intelligence to make improvement. For a
discussion of how the term evolution is misused see Jeffrey F. Addicott, Storm Clouds on
the Horizon of Darwinism: Teaching the Anthropic Principle and Intelligent Design in the
Public Schools, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1507, 1523 (2002) [hereinafter Addicott, Storm Clouds].
3. See, e.g., David A. Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Safety Belt De-
fense, 20 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 867, 868 (1986) (explaining how tort actions penalizing un-
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sions that laws should emanate from the legislative branch of
government, legal mandates rooted in the rich heritage of com-
mon law can come from the workings of the judicial branch. In-
deed, in the modern world, jurisprudence has been a vital compo-
nent in shaping-or attempting to shape-normative behavior
within society by pronouncing new legal obligations, sometimes
even in opposition to the majority will of the people.4
In the context of shaping private sector practices regarding a
given business' duty owed to those injured as a result of negli-
gence, the impact of civil action lawsuits has produced great
change. While there is no question that tort litigation has brought
about a sea of change in how businesses now approach maintain-
ing "reasonable" security protections in the physical world to
shield themselves from liability, this same spirit of concern and
the accompanying change has not yet bled over into the cyber
world. This inequity of security precautions is particularly trou-
bling when one considers that the threat of harm to both individ-
uals and the nation by means of cyber attacks has extreme de-
structive potential. Further, because much of the responsibility
for ensuring safety in the cyber world rests in the hands of pri-
vate business and not the government, it is imperative that the
private sector be motivated to develop far greater levels of cyber-
security than currently exists.
The purpose of this article is to explore the threats posed by
cybersecurity breaches, outline the steps taken by the govern-
ment to address those threats in the private sector economy, and
call attention to the ultimate solution, which will most certainly
spur private businesses to create a more secure cyber environ-
ment for the American people-a Connie Francis-styled cyber civ-
il action lawsuit.
buckled vehicle occupants can foster increased seat belt use); see also Williams J. Holdorf,
The Fraud of Seat-Belt Laws, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Sept. 1, 2002), https://fee.org/arti
cles/the-fraud-of-seat-belt-laws/ (describing that the vast majority of Americans opposed
the enactment of seat-belt laws).
4. A recent illustration of this concept occurred with the 2015 Supreme Court deci-
sion, Obergefell v. Hodges, where the Court held that same-sex marriage was a fundamen-
tal right that states were required to recognize. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015). Prior to
the Court's ruling, the vast majority of states had rejected calls for same-sex marriage.
Even California passed Proposition 8 in 2008 establishing marriage as only between a
man and a woman. See Tamara Audi et al., California Votes for Prop 8, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
5, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122586056759900673.
5. See Garzilli v. Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges, Inc., 419 F. Supp. 1210, 1211-14
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I. THE CONNIE FRANCIS EFFECT
"These kinds of suits [tort civil actions] create economic incen-
tives for crime prevention ... Now when you check into a hotel and
you get a room key that looks like a credit card instead of your
house keys, that is because of a civil lawsuit. It is cheaper for ho-
tels to install an electronic lock system than face the liability expo-
sure of judgments or settlements.... ,
-Jeffrey Dion
Those of age and those who enjoy the pop music of the 1950s
and 1960s easily recall the fabulous vocals of the internationally
known American "singer, recording artist, and professional enter-
tainer,"7 Connie Francis.8 Francis' songs had a meaningful and
long-lasting effect on music and the music industry of her time.
What few realize, however, is that Ms. Francis is also known for
the phenomenal impact that she had in directly improving hotel
security standards throughout the country. As the result of a civil
action lawsuit she brought against Howard Johnson's Motor
Lodges in 1976,9 the large monetary jury award rendered for the
plaintiff had a watershed impact on improving security standards
not just for the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge chain, but for the
entire hotel and motel industry in the United States. Without a
doubt, her case directly led to vast improvements in both the
quantity and quality of physical security measures-the industry
was finally forced to realize their susceptibility to civil lawsuits
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the jury's award for plaintiff, Connie Francis, was not exces-
sive because of her projected lost income and pain and suffering after being attacked in
her room at a motel).
6. See Brenda Craig, Legendary Connie Francis Unsung Hero of Crime Victims Eve-
rywhere, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.lawyersandsettle
ments.com/articles/criminal-law/interview-criminal-law-penal-offense-3-21141.html (quot-
ing Jeffrey Dion, Deputy Executive Director of the National Center for Victims of Crime,
discussing the Connie Francis suit).
7. Garzilli, 419 F. Supp. at 1211.
8. See generally Biography, CONNIE FRANcIS: THE OFFICIAL SITE, http://www.connie
francis.combio4 (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) (giving the biography of singer Connie Francis
and discussing her impact on the American hotel industry).
9. See Garzilli, 419 F. Supp. at 1211-12. At the time of the lawsuit, Connie Francis
was married to her third husband, Mr. Frank Garzilli. Her legal name at the time was
Mrs. Connie Francis Garzilli. See id.
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and the accompanying need to avoid the ensuing scrutiny of a ju-
ry for similar claims of negligence."
The story of how this all came to be is rooted in a horrific sexu-
al assault at knifepoint which occurred in Ms. Francis' hotel room
at a Howard Johnson Motor Lodge in 1974.11 Coming out of a
three-year retirement from live public performances, Francis be-
gan a nationwide singing tour where her first appearance was at
the Westbury Music Fair in Westbury, Long Island, New York.12
On the late evening of November 7, 1974, marking the fourth
night of that engagement there, she returned to her room at the
Howard Johnson Motor Lodge where she had been staying. Later
that evening, a knife-wielding intruder entered her hotel room
through a sliding glass door. The door gave the false appearance
of being securely locked but, in actuality, was easily opened from
the outside. Upon gaining entry, the unknown assailant proceed-
ed to brutally beat and rape Ms. Francis, who believed her life
was only spared because she claimed that she was a famous sing-
er and told her attacker that a relentless investigation would re-
sult if she were murdered.13 The subsequent lawsuit filed in 1976,
Garzilli v. Howard Johnson Motor Lodges, Inc., alleged the fol-
lowing: "Action was brought against motel owner for pain, suffer-
ing, mental anguish, humiliation and loss of earnings resulting
from wife being criminally assaulted in motel and by husband for
deprivation of society, companionship and services of wife."' 4
Common law tort litigation is an ancient component of Anglo-
Saxon law and is concerned with the duty owed to a victim of
harm due to the negligence of someone charged with protecting
the victim while on their premises or under their control or pro-
tection. 5 Obviously, the actual wrongdoer is subject to civil liabil-
ity. However, the culprit is often unknown or judgment proof,
leaving the victim to look for redress from the owner or operator
10. See Chad Callaghan, Safeguarding Hotel Guests, HOTEL BUS. REV., http://hotelexe
cutive.com/businessreview/2808/safeguarding-hotel-guests (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
11. See Richard Harrington, Connie Francis' Crusade, WASH. POST (Dec. 16, 1981),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/1981/12/16/connie-francis-crusadebbf94
9bc-cffa-44ae-95d0-4clf97e7c452/.
12. Biography, CONNIE FRANCIS: THE OFFICIAL SITE, http://www.conniefrancis.com/
bio4 (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
13. See id.
14. Garzilli, 419 F. Supp. at 1210.
15. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
[Vol. 51:857
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of the public facility responsible for their reasonable safekeeping
under the law. As one commentator has rightly put it:
Tort litigation is often trilateral in character. Interposed between the
injurer and the victim is a sentinel charged with protecting the vic-
tim. The sentinel is remiss and the inadequately protected victim is
harmed by a wrongdoer, one whom the sentinel should have, but did
not, repel. The victim may sue both the injurer and the sentinel, but
often the injurer is either unknown or insolvent.
16
Up until the Garzilli case, the avenue of suing the sentinel had
been a less than satisfactory proposition for most victims of crime
such as Connie Francis. While tort law had long recognized "that
a special relationship between two parties gives rise to an affirm-
ative duty to act"17 with due care in the context of that special re-
lationship, the awarded damages for a negligent breach of that
duty had been rather minimal. The types of "special relation-
ships" recognized under the law include such things as innkeeper/
guest, tavern owner/patron, common carrier/passenger, corporate
officer/stockholder, prison facility/inmate, and school/student.
After an emotionally charged four-week trial, made even more
notable due to the celebrity status of Connie Francis, the jury
awarded the plaintiffs an unprecedented $2,650,000 in total
damages after finding that the motel's failure to provide reasona-
ble security measures was the proximate cause of the beating and
rape. The fact that the court acknowledged ample evidence of
negligence on the part of Howard Johnson's Motor Lodges and
absolutely no evidence of contributory negligence by Ms. Francis,
certainly helped increase the amount of awarded damages. At
16. William K. Jones, Tort Triad. Slumbering Sentinels, Vicious Assailants, and Vic-
tims Variously Vigilant, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253 (2001). Liability in a negligence action
requires that the victim prove: (1) that the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff to take
reasonable care to avoid the attack or reduce its risk; (2) that defendant breached this du-
ty; (3) that the breach was the actual and legal cause of the attack; and (4) that the breach
resulted in actual harm. See Mark P. Buell, Liability for Inadequate Security, 69 FLA. B.J.
58 (1995).
17. R. Jeffrey Harris, Whither the Witness the Federal Government's Special Duty of
Protection in Criminal Proceedings After Piechowicz v. United States, 76 CORNELL L. REV.
1285, 1292 (1991).
18. See Daniel B. Kennedy & R. Thomas Hupp, Apartment Security and Litigation:
Key Issues, 11 SECURITY J. 21, 22 (1998). The jury awarded Connie Francis "$2.5 million in
compensatory damages and her husband $150,000." Ms. Francis later settled with Howard
Johnson's for $1.5 million. Id.
19. See Garzilli, 419 F. Supp. at 1212 n.2 ("Plaintiffs' proof with respect to defendant's
negligence and proximate cause was ample and there was little, if anything, on which to
2017]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the time, the recovery in Garzilli was the largest judgment ever
awarded where a third party was held liable for an act of sexual
assault which had occurred on their premises.2" In terms of dam-
ages, the court stated the following:
Connie Francis' projected loss of earnings for the ensuing ten years
would have been $2,585,000 and this would have made no allowance
for the substantial cost-of-living increases which occurred between
1969 and 1974. In addition, of course, none of such calculations
makes any allowance whatsoever for the criminal assault, the hor-
rendous results which ensued therefrom and the pain, suffering,
mental anguish and humiliation which followed.21
If the hotel and motel industry did not previously comprehend
that they could be held liable for such vast sums of money for
foreseeable criminal injuries suffered by tenants or guests on
their premises, they did after Garzilli. Garzilli greatly expanded
the legal obligations owed to tenants in terms of "reasonable-
ness;" which, in turn, expanded the level of care now owed to pre-
vent such foreseeable criminal harm.22 In other words, by raising
the bar for reasonableness, Garzilli set a most telling precedent
for premises owners and operators regarding their "vicarious ...
liability for intentional torts committed by intruders."2 Now
viewed through the new prism of the Connie Francis case, if
premises owners did not institute greater level of reasonable pre-
cautions to protect guests on their property from the foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties, they could face huge monetary pun-
ishments.24 In addition, Garzilli signaled that courts would now
increase the duty of care owed by the hotel industry by expanding
the scope of constructive notice regarding any prior criminal inci-
dents that had occurred on the hotel/motel property, even if such
crimes were different than those inflicted upon the plaintiff.25 The
base an argument that either or both of them was contributorily negligent.").
20. Robert Alan Palmer, The Hospitality Customer as Crime Victim: Recent Legal Re-
search, 13 J. HOSPITALITY & TOURISM RES. 225, 226 (1989).
21. Garzilli, 419 F. Supp. at 1213.
22. See Michael Green & William C. Powers, Jr., Apportionment of Liability, 10 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 30, 38-39 (2000).
23. Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 563, 598
(1988).
24. See generally Ellen Bublick, Upside Down? Terrorist, Proprietors, and Civil Re-
sponsibility for Crime Prevention in the Post-9/11 Tort-Reform World, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1483, 1508-11 (2008) (discussing the expanded view of tort liability).
25. See Frederick B. Jonassen, The Law and the Host of The Canterbury Tales, 43 J.
[Vol. 51:857
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court in Garzilli noted that four previous burglaries on the prem-
ises had essentially put Howard Johnson's Motor Lodge on con-
structive notice to take a higher level of what it had previously
considered to be "reasonable care" for its guests. According to the
court, it was not enough that new locks had been ordered but
were not yet installed at the time of the rape.2 6
The Garzilli case continues to be cited in a multitude of legal
journals throughout the United States as the seminal case dis-
cussing tort liability vis-A-vis improved hotel and motel security
standards.27 In terms of demonstrating how the law can evolve to
advance new societal norms and standards, law journals invaria-
bly note how the entire legal landscape relative to victims' rights
has been altered by the Connie Francis case." This one case
launched an avalanche of litigation against owners and operators
of all sorts of business establishments, not just hotels. In the
wake of Garzilli, scores of civil actions were filed across the na-
tion not only by victims assaulted at hotels or motels, but also at
shopping malls, movie theatres, restaurants, bars, public parks,
etc.29
While victims in their individual capacities could now expect
just compensation for their injuries based on the precedent set by
Garzilli, the collateral impact of the Connie Francis jury award
dramatically impacted the general public, as well. Increased
physical premises security meant greater peace of mind for the
countless number of people who lodge at such facilities. Further-
more, the sea of change in improved security measures spawned
by Garzilli took place quickly. Similar to the reaction of beachgo-
ers to news of a shark attack, the movement within the hotel in-
dustry to greatly increase security measures was swift and dra-
matic. Almost overnight, owners and operators spent significant
funds to vastly improve all things related to physical security, in-
cluding better locks and lighting."
MARSHALL L. REV. 51, 78 (2009), for an excellent discussion on innkeeper liability.
26. See id.
27. See, e.g., Buell, supra note 16, at 58; Jordan H. Leibman, Comparative Contribu-
tion and Intentional Torts: A Remaining Roadblock to Damages Apportionment, 30 AM.
Bus. L.J. 677, 677 (1992).
28. See, e.g., William K. Jones, Tort Triad: Slumbering Sentinels, Vicious Assailants,
and Victims Variously Vigilant, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 253, 253 (2001).
29. See Buell, supra note 16, at 58.
30. See Chad Callaghan, Lodging No Complaints, 45 SECURITY MGMT. 72, 72 (2001);
2017]
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In summary, the significant improvements in hotel and motel
physical security in the United States was not the result of legis-
lative initiative or executive mandate, but rather the workings of
a single civil action litigation. In large part, the reason for what
might be termed the Connie Francis effect rests in the nature of
capitalism. While capitalism is undoubtedly the best economic
protocol known to mankind for ensuring the maximum amount of
individual and collective prosperity within a national entity,"3 it
clearly operates at its best when the owners and operators of
businesses in the private sector economy possess and are moti-
vated by virtue," not just profit. Sadly, those that are motivated
solely for profit will only respond in positive ways when under a
cost-benefit analysis based on a loss of revenue or the threat of a
loss of revenue. For the "crooked" capitalist, virtuous behavior
must be forced.
In much the same way that the Connie Francis lawsuit spurred
a quantum leap forward in improved physical security for certain
businesses, a similar scenario will soon shape the future of cyber-
security practices in the private sector. Not a day passes that
news outlets do not report new cybersecurity breaches of one sort
or another.33 As more data breaches occur due to increased cyber
attacks and harm results from the unauthorized release of per-
sonally identifiable information ("PII"), or more importantly, ac-
tual physical harm, civil law suits will proportionally mount to
sue those targeted businesses that have failed to provide reason-
able cybersecurity protections. As with Garzilli and its progeny, it
is certainly likely that the concept of reasonableness for main-
taining appropriate cybersecurity will soon far exceed current in-
dustry standards. Indeed, with every new cyber related lawsuit,
Susan H. Ivancevich & Daniel M. Ivancevich, Mitigating Inadequate Security Claims
Through Effective Security Measures, 2 GAMING RES. & REV. J. 49, 50 (1995); Chad Calla-
ghan, Safeguarding Hotel Guests, HOTEL BUS. REV., http://hotelexecutive.com/business
_review/2808/safeguarding-hotel-guests (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
31. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) (exploring the causes of wealth creation).
32. See R.B. THIEME, JR., CHRISTIAN INTEGRITY 51-56 (2002) (equating the require-
ments of citizenship with impersonal love, integrity, and virtue); see also, JEFFREY F.
ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW: MATERIALS, CASES, COMMENTS 357-67, 385 (7th ed. 2014)
(discussing the nature of virtue and distinguishing the requirements of being a model citi-
zen with the mechanics of grace salvation) [hereinafter ADDICOTT, TERRORISM LAW].
33. See, e.g., Drew Fitzgerald, Source of Cyberattack Narrowed, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26,
2016, at A2 (speculating that the massive cyber attack in the United States on October 21,
2016 which hit Netflix, Twitter, and other websites, was the work of non-state actors).
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businesses are being put on notice that greater levels of cyberse-
curity are expected, and juries will become less receptive to ex-
cuses. Still, as of this writing, most businesses seem content to
simply hold their breath and wait. They seem unwilling to take
the necessary steps to put sufficient time and money into improv-
ing their cybersecurity posture in anticipation of the future tort
actions that will surely come. Again, it is as if they are awaiting
the Connie Francis touchstone cyber tort lawsuit with unfathom-
able monetary damages before they will respond. Nevertheless,
when the Connie Francis-styled cyber lawsuit comes, and it will,
America will see the transformation overnight as cybersecurity
upgrades cascade throughout the private sector, proving once
again that economic principles are the catalyst for much needed
improvement.
II. THE DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK OF CYBER
The fantastic workings of cyber technology have made the
world of today vastly different than it was in the day of Connie
Francis and her contemporaries. In a nutshell, the modern world
we now enjoy is totally dependent on the workings of the cyber
world. In 2014, the United States Supreme Court expressed this
matter in terms of the mobile phone, but it applies to our depend-
ence on all things cyber: "[It is no exaggeration to say that many
of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone
keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of
their lives-from the mundane to the intimate."34
With billions of users, the cyber realm not only facilitates hu-
man communication-e.g., by Internet or mobile phone-it also
consists of complex software packages and databases that regu-
late all aspects of societal infrastructure. These regulatory data-
bases include the provision of water, electricity, banking, trans-
portation, technology, agriculture, medical, nuclear facilities,
waste management, and other services of government. While
most of these services have utilized an electronic medium for
some time, the major difference now is that we cannot operate
any of them apart from the workings and complex actions of cyber
technology. This dependency opens up new vulnerabilities that
sorely challenge the limits of current cybersecurity protection.
34. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490 (2014).
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As with any technical field of endeavor, scores of new and un-
familiar terms associated with cyberspace have entered the mod-
ern lexicon. Accordingly, before one can fully discuss the need for
improving cybersecurity, certain foundational terms require defi-
nition. Chief among the baseline concepts are: cyberspace, critical
infrastructure, supervisory control and data acquisition
("SCADA"), and cyber attacks.
A. Cyberspace
The central term of discussion is labeled cyberspace. Cyber-
space has many connotations and is used in a variety of contexts;
synonyms include virtual space and cyber world. In the common
understanding of the term, cyberspace refers to the entire func-
tion of computer-centric information technology ("IT")-hardware
and software-as it is created, stored, and transmitted in the
non-physical (cyber) and physical world. A 2016 Congressional
Service Report refers to cyberspace as follows: "[T]he worldwide
collection of connected ICT [Information and Communication
Technology] components, the information that is stored in and
flows through those components, and the ways that information
is structured and processed."3
The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associ-
ated Terms defines cyberspace as follows: "A global domain with-
in the information environment consisting of the interdependent
network of information technology infrastructures and resident
data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, com-
puter systems, and embedded processors and controllers. 36
B. Critical Infrastructure
The term critical infrastructure is defined with more or less uni-
formity in a variety of documents and laws. Critical infrastructure
refers to all the services provided that are associated with sustain-
ing modern society, all of which have unique physical and cyber
components. For instance, in the 2003 National Strategy for the
35. ERIC A. FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43831, CYBERSECURITY ISSUES AND
CHALLENGES: IN BRIEF 1 n.2 (2016) [hereinafter FISHER, CYBERSECURITY ISSUES].
36. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 1-02, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 58 (Nov. 2010) (as amended through Feb. 2016).
[Vol. 51:857
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Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") provides a detailed list
of assets of national importance-i.e., critical infrastructure. This
list includes: IT; telecommunications; chemicals; transportation;
emergency services; postal and shipping services; agriculture and
food; public health and healthcare; drinking water/water treat-
ment; energy; banking and finance; national monuments and
icons; defense industrial base; key industry/technology sites; and
large gathering sites." In a 2007 publication by the DHS, the
agency's list identifies five general types of critical infrastructure:
(1) production industries: energy, chemical, defense industrial
base; (2) service industries: banking and finance, transportation,
postal and shipping; (3) sustenance and health: agriculture, food,
water, public health; (4) federal and state: government, emergen-
cy services; and (5) IT and cyber: information, telecommunica-
tions."
Section 5159(b)(2) of the Critical Infrastructures Protection Act
("CIPA") identifies critical infrastructures as "telecommunica-
tions, energy, financial services, water, and transportation sec-
tors."39 In addition, CIPA specifically recognizes the importance of
critical infrastructure to society by adding that the term means
all "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such sys-
tems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, na-
tional economic security, national public health or safety, or any
combination of those matters.""0
Reflecting America's founding roots in capitalism and the free
market economy, private businesses own and operate approxi-
mately 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure.4' Accord-
ingly, the responsibility for maintaining physical and cyber secu-
rity at these facilities primarily rests on private shoulders-not
on the federal government. The conundrum for the government,
37. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL
PROTECTION OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS 35 (2003).
38. See HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
(2007).
39. Critical Infrastructures Protection Act (CIPA) of 2001, 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(b)(2)
(2012).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e).
41. Douglas C. Michael, Self-Regulation for Safety and Security: Final Minutes or Fin-
est Hour?, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1075, 1128 n.268 (2006).
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of course, is that it is charged with protecting the American peo-
ple, not private industry.
C. SCADA
In the modern world, all critical infrastructures are operated
by means of an electronic control system. This system regulates
the thousands of interconnected computers, servers, routers, and
switches associated with the myriad physical and virtual tasks
inherent in operating and maintaining the functions of a given
industry. In the day of Connie Francis, many of these tasks were
predominately handled by people; but today, they are electroni-
cally monitored and controlled by centralized computer networks
called SCADA systems, industrial control systems ("ICS"), dis-
tributed control systems ("DCS"), programmable logic control sys-
tems ("PLCS"),42 or any functionally equivalent system. Since
SCADA is the general and most common term to describe the
electronic "nervous system" of these critical infrastructures, it is
the term that will be used here.43
SCADA systems, and other equivalent systems, digitize and
automate almost every imaginable task associated with a given
critical infrastructure-from opening and closing valves in nucle-
ar facilities, to operating circuit breakers on electrical power
grids, to managing air traffic in the sky. In other words, SCADA
systems provide the brain power to manage a critical infrastruc-
ture. Clearly, as will be discussed later, this makes the critical in-
frastructure extremely vulnerable to cyber attacks, which could
cause massive economic and physical damage across broad sec-
tions of the country.44
42. See Robert K. Palmer, Critical Infrastructure: Legislative Factors for Preventing a
"Cyber-Pearl Harbor" 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 289, 300 (2014) (defining industrial control sys-
tems); Industrial Automation Market-Global Industry Analysis, Size, Share, Growth,
Trends, and Forecast 2016-2024, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.prnewswire.
com/news-releases/industrial-automation-market---global-industry-analysis-size-share-gro
wth-trends-and-forecast-2016 ---2024-300390335.html (defining SCADA, DCS, and PLCS).
43. See Palmer, supra note 42, at 302.
44. See, e.g., Hillary Hellmann, Comment, Acknowledging the Threat: Securing United
States Pipeline SCADA Systems, 36 ENERGY L.J. 157, 158, 163 (2015) (discussing how
United States oil and gas pipeline SCADA systems are threatened by large-scale cyber
attacks).
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Since the vast majority of critical infrastructures rest in the
hands of private industry, where the predominate emphasis for
the owners is on maintaining system reliability and efficiency,
putting large sums of money into increased cybersecurity is often
of less importance to the federal government.45 Incredibly, many
SCADAs are connected to their own private corporate networks,
which are in turn primarily connected directly or indirectly to the
Internet. To those familiar with the process, this is a recipe for
disaster. The resulting vulnerability presents an open door for an
actor with the necessary skills to hack into a SCADA and, for ex-
ample, disable the valves at a nuclear facility, shut down an en-
tire electrical power grid, or redirect air traffic to harmful flight
patterns.
D. Cyber Attacks
Not all disruptions of an information system's confidentiality,
integrity, or availability ("CIA") constitute a cyber attack. The
majority of SCADA disruptions are caused by unintentional hu-
man error or normal wear and tear, and are best described as
cyber incidents.46 On the other hand, the term cyber attack is
most certainly the correct phrase to describe the intentional dis-
ruption of a SCADA's CIA.
All intentional attacks on a computer or its network involve ac-
tions that are meant to disrupt, destroy, or deny information.
These unauthorized cyber intrusions or attacks may be performed
by state actors or non-state actors seeking notoriety, monetary
gain, political advantage, or even hope to engage in vandalism,
terrorism, or acts of war. Thus, it is not only the matter of cyber
crime, which costs billions of dollars a year to the economy, but
also the fear of cyber attacks as a method of warfare.47 In fact,
45. See Michael, supra note 41, at 1128.
46. The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines incident as: "An oc-
currence that actually or potentially jeopardizes the confidentiality, integrity, or availabil-
ity (CIA) of an information system or the information the system processes, stores, or
transmits or that constitutes a violation or imminent threat of violation of security poli-
cies, security procedures, or acceptable use policies." NAT'L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., U.S.
DEPT. COM., FIPS PUB 200, MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL
INFORMATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 7 (2006). Such incidents may be intentional or
unintentional. See id.
47. See Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyber-
terrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57,
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planting harmful software in electronic systems to "obliterate, al-
ter, or appropriate data has become a crucial new tactic of war-
fare,"48 clearly apart from the traditional notions of fighting by
land, sea, or air. But the real fear, regardless of the source of the
attack, is that a cyber-strike against the nation will hit and crip-
ple a critical infrastructure.
While most cyber breaches have involved hacks into various
companies and led to the release of customer P11, the overriding
concern that energizes any discussion of cybersecurity is the fear
that a significant cyber attack will target one or more of the na-
tion's critical infrastructures and cause massive physical harm.
Although the cyber attack equivalent of Pearl Harbor has yet to
occur against one of the nation's critical infrastructures, signifi-
cant SCADA cyber attacks have already occurred and continue to
occur. Two examples below are illustrative: one involves an "in-
sider" conducting a cyber attack on a SCADA, and the other in-
volves an "outsider" doing the same.
In R v Boden," the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia,
upheld twenty of the twenty-six convictions against a disgruntled
employee by the name of Vitek Boden. Boden hacked into the
SCADA of an Australian sewage and water treatment plant and
directed the pumping of 800,000 liters of sewage into the envi-
ronment, causing millions of dollars in damage. He was appre-
hended during a routine traffic stop in Queensland where he was
found in possession of a stolen computer and radio transmitter,
which he had used to turn his vehicle into a mobile "command
center.""° Over the course of two months in 2000, and on forty-six
separate occasions, Boden directed the SCADA to pump massive
amounts of raw sewage into the local environment.
So-called insider threats are often done by disgruntled employ-
ees, like Boden, and are extremely serious. Remaining undetect-
74-77 (2010).
48. Claire 0. Finkelstein & Kevin H. Govern, Introduction: Cyber and the Changing
Face of War, at xiv (Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 15-20, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2598671.
49. R v. Boden [2002] QCA 164 (Austl.); Marshall Abrams & Joe Weiss, Malicious
Control System Cyber Security Attack Case Study-Maroochy Water Services, Australia,
MITRE (2008), https://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/pdf/08_1145.pdf.
50. Barton Gellman, Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared, WASH. POST (June 27, 2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyr/content/article/2006/06/12/AR2006AR200606120
0711_pf.html.
[Vol. 51:857
ENHANCING CYBERSECURITY
ed, the insider can do a variety of harm such as altering encryp-
tion and communication applications in order to copy input and
output data from the control terminals to various hidden sections
on the system. 1
In United States v. Mitra, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin convicted an "outsider" who
was able to singlehandedly breach the sophisticated cyber com-
mand and control system of a critical infrastructure, not just
once, but on two separate occasions. 2 The defendant Rajib Mitra
was convicted of two counts of intentional interference with com-
puter-related systems used in interstate commerce, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).53 In 2003, while a student at the Universi-
ty of Wisconsin's graduate business school, Mitra successfully
hacked into and shut down the computer-based radio system
Smartnet II (made by Motorola) for police, fire, ambulance, and
other emergency communications in the entire city of Madison,
Wisconsin. On Halloween night of 2003, Mitra struck the State
capital:
[A] powerful signal had blanketed all of the City's communications
towers and prevented the computer from receiving, on the control
channel, data essential to parcel traffic among the other 19 channels.
Madison was hosting between 50,000 and 100,000 visitors that day.
When disturbances erupted, public safety departments were unable
to coordinate their activities because the radio system was down.
Although the City repeatedly switched the control channel for the
Smartnet system, a step that temporarily restored service, the inter-
ferin signal changed channels too and again blocked the system's
use.
On November 11, 2003, Mitra changed tactics. Instead of block-
ing signals, he sent signals that directed the newly replaced
"Smartnet base station to keep channels open, and at the end of
each communication the attacker appended a sound, such as a
woman's sexual moan.
'55
51. Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Emerging Threat of Cyberterrorism, in 22
UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM: ANALYSIS OF SOCIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS
259, 262 (Suleyman Ozeren et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Addicott, Emerging Threat].
52. 405 F.3d 493, 493 (7th Cir. 2005).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Finally, perhaps the most well-reported attack on a SCADA oc-
curred in April 2007 when coordinated cyber-attacks disrupted
large portions of the banking and communication systems of the
Baltic country of Estonia for almost a month."b The denial of ser-
vice ("DoDS")57 attack was probably the work of Russian hackers
in response to the removal of a bronze statue of a World War II
era Soviet soldier from a park in Estonia. When one considers
that terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS8 have
been using computers, e-mail, and encryption to support and fi-
nance their organizations for years, it is only logical to conclude
that they are also fully aware that cyber attacks offer a low cost
method of inflicting major damage to the West. 9
Ironically, it was the west, not the Russians or Chinese, that
actually engaged in the first significant cyber attack in the con-
text of directly causing massive physical damage to a critical in-
frastructure. In June 2012, the New York Times reported that the
United States and Israel had sent a massive virus that infected
the SCADA of the Iranian nuclear reactor at Natanz. ° The so-
called Stuxnet virus caused major damage and was acknowledged
by former Central Intelligence Agency Director Michael Hayden
as "the first attack of a major nature in which a cyber attack was
used to effect physical destruction."61
Although the cyber attack against Iran was significant, the
United States endures the highest levels of continued and concen-
trated cyber attacks from not just terrorists or non-state actors,
56. See Scheherazade Rehman, Estonia's Lessons in Cyberwarfare, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report2013/O1/
14/estonia-shows-how-to-build-a-defense-against-cyberwarfare; Ian Traynor, Russia Ac-
cused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia, THE GUARDIAN (May 16, 2007), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.nssia. The Estonian cyber attack
resulted in a digital infrastructure disaster as websites for government officials, govern-
ment agencies, daily newspapers, and Estonia's biggest banks were overwhelmed and shut
down due to the cyber onslaught of "unknown" digital information attacks. Id.
57. See infra note 66 and accompanying chart.
58. JAMES SCOT & DREW SPANIEL, THE ANATOMY OF CYBER JIHAD: CYBERSPACE IS
THE NEW GREAT EQUALIZER 5-11, 40 (2016).
59. See JEFFREY F. ADDICOTT, RADIAL ISLAM WHY?: CONFRONTING JIHAD AT HOME &
ABROAD 12-13 (2016) [hereinafter ADDICOTT, RADICAL ISLAM].
60. David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2012, at Ai [hereinafter Sanger, Obama Order].
61. DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL 200 (2012) [hereinafter SANGER,
CONFRONT AND CONCEAL].
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but a variety of actors such as China, North Korea, and Russia.
In 2013, the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations, Congressman
Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI) testified at a formal hearing that the
"United States has been the subject of the most coordinated and
sustained computer attacks the world has ever seen."62 Federal
Bureau of Investigations Director James Comey told Congress in
early 2016 that the nation "continue[s] to see an increase in the
scale and scope of reporting on malicious cyber activity that can
be measured by the amount of corporate data stolen or deleted,
personally identifiable information compromised, or remediation
costs incurred by United States victims.
6 3
In a study issued by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies ("CSIS"), the annual cost of cyber attacks on the world's
private sector and its consumers is over $445 billion dollars, and
perhaps as high as $575 billion. 4 The report went on to find that,
in the United States alone, an estimated 200,000 jobs were simp-
ly not created in the civilian economy due to the billions of dollars
in losses. 5
So what are the techniques employed in a cyber attack? A June
2007 Government Accountability Office ("GAO") Report, produced
a layman's chart that lists the most common techniques employed
62. Investigating and Prosecuting 21st Century Cyber Threats: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations of the H. Comm.
On the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Chairman,
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations).
63. FBI Budget Request for Fiscal Year 2017 Before the H. Appropriations Comm,
Subcomm. On Commerce, Justice, Sci., and Related Agencies (Feb. 25, 2016) (statement by
James B. Comey), https://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/fbi-budget-request-for-fiscal-year-
2017.
64. Tom Risen, Study: Hackers Cost More Than $445 Billion Annually, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (Jan 9, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/06/O9/study-hack
ers-cost-more-than-445-billion-annually.
65. Id.
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by hackers, each with a brief description." The Report presented
66. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-705, CYBERCRIME: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE ENTITIES FACE CHALLENGES IN ADDRESSING CYBER THREATS (2007).
Type Description
Sending unsolicited commercial e-mail advertising for products, ser-Spanmning vices, and websites. Spam can also be used as a delivery mechanism
for malware and other cyber threats.
A high-tech scam that frequently uses spam or pop-up messages to
deceive people into disclosing their credit card numbers, bank ac-
Phishing count information, Social Security numbers, passwords, or other
sensitive information. Internet scammers use e-mail bait to "phish"
for passwords and financial data from the sea of Internet users.
Creating a fraudulent website to mimic an actual, well-known web-
Spoofing site run by another party. E-mail spoofing occurs when the sender
address and other parts of an e-mail header are altered to appear as
though the e-mail originated from a different source. Spoofing hides
the origin of an e-mail message.
A method used by phishers to deceive users into believing that they
are communicating with a legitimate website. Pharming uses a va-
riety of technical methods to redirect a user to a fraudulent or
Pharming spoofed website when the user types in a legitimate Web address.
For example, one pharming technique is to redirect users-without
their knowledge-to a different website from the one they intended
to access. Also, software vulnerabilities may be exploited or mal-
ware employed to redirect the user to a fraudulent website when the
user types in a legitimate address.
Denial-of- An attack in which one user takes up so much of a shared resource
service that none of the resource is left for other users. Denial-of-service
Attack attacks compromise the availability of the resource.
A variant of the denial-of-service attack that uses a coordinated at-
Distributed tack from a distributed system of computers rather than from a sin-
denial-of-service gle source. It often makes use of worms to spread to multiple com-
puters that can then attack the target.
A program that "infects" computer files, usually executable pro-
Viruses grams, by inserting a copy of itself into the file. These copies are
usually executed when the infected file is loaded into memory, al-
lowing the virus to infect other files. A virus requires human in-
volvement (usually unwitting) to propagate.
Trojan horse A computer program that conceals harmful code. It usually mas-
querades as a useful program that a user would wish to execute.
An independent computer program that reproduces by copying itself
from one system to another across a network. Unlike computer vi-
ruses, worms do not require human involvement to propagate.
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four general types of cyber attacks. The first and most common
cyber attack involves a service disruption or the distributed deni-
al of service ("DDoS"), which aims to flood the target computer
with data packets or connection requests, thereby making it una-
vailable to the user or, in the case of a website, unavailable to the
website's visitors. A second, but related, type of cyber attack is
designed to capture and then control certain elements of cyber-
space in order to use them as actual weapons. The third category
is aimed at theft of assets from, for example, financial institu-
tions. Finally, an attack can also manifest itself by means of a
conventional explosive event on a physical structure, such as a
physical building that houses a SCADA."7
III. CYBERSECURITY
"It's going to happen again [massive cyber-attack]. '6 8
-Martin McKeny
A. Defining Cybersecurity
There is no commonly accepted definition for the term cyberse-
curity. Different uses of the term can be found in a wide variety of
federal laws, executive orders, presidential directives, and other
agency directives. Taken together, cybersecurity means protect-
ing the basic security of computerized systems from unauthorized
access.
Malicious software designed to carry out annoying or harmful ac-
Malware tions. Malware often masquerades as useful programs or is embed-
ded into useful programs so that users are induced into activating
them. Malware can include viruses, worms, and spyware.
Spyware Malware installed without the user's knowledge to surreptitiously
track and/or transmit data to an unauthorized third party.
A network of remotely controlled systems used to coordinate attacks
and distribute malware, spam, and phishing scams. Bots (short forBotnet "robots") are programs that are covertly installed on a targeted sys-
tem allowing an unauthorized user to remotely control the compro-
mised computer for a variety of malicious purposes.
67. See ADDIcOTT, TERRORISM LAW, supra note 32, at 321-23.
68. See Drew Fitzgerald, National Intelligence Director Says Data Suggests 'Nonstate
Actor' Was Behind Cyberattack, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 2016, at A2. Mr. McKeny is a cyber-
security analyst for Akamai Technologies, Inc. Id.
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While there are many competing definitions regarding cyberse-
curity, a 2005 Congressional Research Service Report entitled:
Creating a National Framework for Cybersecurity: An Analysis of
Issues and Options, " presents an efficacious starting point.
A set of activities and other measures intended to protect-from at-
tack, disruption, or other threats--computers, computer networks,
related hardware and devices software, and the information they
contain and communicate, including software and data, as well as
other elements of cyberspace. The activities can include security au-
dits, patch management, authentication procedures, access man-
agement, and so forth. They can involve, for example, examining and
evaluating the strengths and vulnerabilities of the hardware and
software used in the country's political and economic electronic in-
frastructure. They also involve detection and reaction to security
events, mitigation of impacts, and recovery of affected components.
Other measures can include such things as hardware and software
firewalls, physical security such as hardened facilitates, and person-
nel training and responsibilities.7
As previously stated, cybersecurity breaches originate from a
variety of sources to include hostile nations, criminals, competi-
tors, disgruntled employees,7' terrorists, "script-kiddies,' and
just human error.7 ' Further, breaches occur in the government
and private sectors alike. For instance, in 2015 the Office of Per-
sonnel Management suffered cybersecurity attacks that resulted
in the disclosure of PIH of over 4.2 million current and former gov-
ernment employees, with another 21.5 million background inves-
69. ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32777, CREATING A NATIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR CYBERSECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND OPTIONS 5-6 (2005) [here-
inafter FISCHER, NATIONAL FRAMEWORK], https: Iwww.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32777.pdf.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Damian Paletta, Ex-NSA Contractor Stole at Least 500 Million Pages of
Records and Secrets, U.S. Says, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2016, at A3 (discussing a contractor
suspected of theft from the National Security Agency that contributed to the development
of highly sensitive cybertools and cyberweapons used by the American government).
72. See supra note 51 and accompanying text; see also Rupert Cocke, Online Banks
Are Often Easy Prey For Hackers, Security Experts Say, WALL ST. J. (June 17, 2002), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB1024259787474741600 (discussing the definition of a "script-
kiddie").
73. See, e.g., Alexander Boyko et al., Investigating the Sayano-Shushenskaya Hy-
dro Power Plant Disaster, POWER MAG. (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.powermag.com/investi
gating-the-sayano-shushenskaya-hydro-power-plant-disaster/. In 2009, the Sayano-
Shushenskaya Russian hydroelectric power plant was shut down for maintenance. A com-
puter technician at a separate location who was unaware of the cause for the shutdown
used his computer to send an electronic signal to turn the main turbine back on. As a re-
sult of this human error, seventy-five people were killed and the facility suffered a billion
dollars worth of damage. Id.
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tigative records released."4 In the June 2016 issue of Time, a story
discussed how the hackers were able to penetrate the interna-
tional banking system run by "a vast and powerful consortium
called SWIFT, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunication."7 Hackers infiltrated Bangladesh's central
banking system and sent numerous forged SWIFT messages out
to other banks, requesting the electronic transfer of "roughly $1
billion to accounts in Asia.""6
B. Leaning Forward in the Saddle
One of the byproducts of the September 11 terrorist attacks
("9/11") is the realization that if significant parts of the physical
world could be destroyed by dedicated fanatics, a fortiori, our
cyber world, which regulates all aspects of the critical infrastruc-
ture, might well be next. As evidenced by the ever-rising number
of cyber attacks, it is certain that the level of cybersecurity pro-
tection is less than satisfactory, both in the government and the
private sector. America's critical infrastructure is extremely vul-
nerable and ripe for a massive cyber attack. Ultimately, the real
issue is not necessarily the nature or motivation of the perpetra-
tor, it is one of cybersecurity." Regardless of the entity engaged in
the cyber attack, the real question is this: Does a sufficient cyber-
security framework exist that can adequately protect cyberspace
and the information it contains, processes, and transmits?
Despite the seriousness of cyber attacks, the truth is many ex-
perts agree the United States does not have a sufficient cyberse-
curity posture to protect cyberspace, or more importantly, the
74. Cybersecurity Resource Center, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.
gov/cybersecurity/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
75. Haley Sweetland Edwards, A New Generation of Bank Robbers Infiltrates Global
Finance, TIME, June 13, 2016, at 9.
76. Id.
77. See Statements & Releases, Office of the Press Sec'y, FACT SHEET- White House
Summit on Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 13, 2015), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/13/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-cybersecu
rity-and-consumer-protection. Under 6 U.S.C. § 1501(5)(A) (2012 & Supp. III 2016), a "cy-
bersecurity threat" is defined as follows:
[A]n action, not protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, on or through an information system that may result in an
unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security, availability, confidenti-
ality, or integrity of an information system or information that is stored on,
processed by, or transiting an information system.
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SCADA that operates and maintains our critical infrastructure.
Private industry is only partially regulated through the actions of
a handful of legislative and administrative requirements; and yet,
the primary responsibility for physical security and cybersecurity
rests in their hands.
IV. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO SECURE CYBERSPACE
"There are risks and costs to a program of action. But they are
far less than the long-range risks and costs of comfortable inac-
tion.
,
"
78
-- John F. Kennedy
In May 2009, President Obama released a Cyberspace Policy
Review which contained a harsh analysis of the federal govern-
ment's preparedness:
The Federal government is not organized to address this growing
problem [cyber attacks] effectively now or in the future. Responsibil-
ities for cybersecurity are distributed across a wide array of federal
departments and agencies, many with overlapping authorities, and
none with sufficient decision authority to direct actions that deal
with often conflicting issues in a consistent way.79
This assessment remains accurate today in 2017. Despite the
streamlining benefits associated with the recently enacted Cyber-
security Information Sharing Act ("CISA"), the overall govern-
mental framework for dealing with cybersecurity issues is clearly
more hands-off than hands-on. Accordingly, there exists a hodge-
podge of over fifty federal statutes and numerous executive direc-
tives and orders, all of which reflect a rather disjointed strategy
to prod the private sector forward."0 For instance, Congress
passed four cybersecurity bills in 2014 which sought to update
certain areas of the law to reflect current and emerging issues re-
lated to cybersecurity." The bills were the National Cybersecurity
78. The John F. Kennedy University Story, JOHN F. KENNEDY UNIV. (2017), http:/!
www.jfku.edu/About-Us/The-JFK-University-Story.html.
79. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL & HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, CYBERSPACE POLICY
REVIEW, ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE i (2009).
80. ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO
CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS (2013).
81. See Covington & Burlington LLP, Congress Passes Four Cybersecurity Bills, NAT.
L. REV. (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passes-four-cyber
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Protection Act ("NCPA") of 2014,82 Federal Information Security
Modernization Act ("FISMA") of 2014,83 Cybersecurity Enhance-
ment Act ("CEA") of 2014,84 and Cybersecurity Workforce As-
sessment Act ("CWAA") of 2014.5 Of the four bills, the NCPA was
the most important for the private sector. The NCPA codified
provisions in the National Cybersecurity and Communications
Integration Center and energized the DHS with a renewed au-
thority to partner with the private sector.8" The NCPA also creat-
ed a federal agency data breach notification law that requires
federal agencies to quickly notify individuals who are affected by
87a data breach, as well as certain Congressional committees.
A. Engagement Strategy
Starting with the Clinton administration and continuing to the
Trump administration, the government's approach to cybersecuri-
ty for owners and operators of private computer systems has been
one of cooperative engagement, not mandatory government regu-
lation, to encourage the implementation of greater levels of cyber-
security." Just as the government cannot dictate the technology
that private industry must develop in the marketplace, it cannot
force private industry to adopt cybersecurity standards.
The government's reluctance to regulate is most certainly driv-
en by many practical considerations. For instance, the govern-
ment could never mandate a particular level of cybersecurity for
the private sector for two primary reasons. First, by the time a
particular government bureaucracy could agree on developing
fixed standards for a given system, that effort would be rendered
obsolete by new advances in the technology. Second, it is equally
clear that government employees simply would not possess the
technical abilities to even develop standards-the skills required
to do so would draw such individuals into the far more rewarding
security-bills.
82. 6 U.S.C. §§ 148-50 (2014 & Supp. III 2015).
83. 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551-76 (2012 & Supp. II 2014).
84. 15 U.S.C § 7421 (2012 & Supp. I1 2015).
85. 6 U.S.C. § 146 (2012 & Supp. III 2015).
86. See id. §§ 148-50.
87. Id.
88. See Amitai Etzioni, The Private Sector: A Reluctant Partner in Cybersecurity, 15
GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 69, 69 (2014).
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business world. Thus, despite the rapidly expanding reliance on
cyber technology by American businesses and consumers, the
government provides extremely little affirmative regulatory activ-
ity in terms of cybersecurity functions for non-government cyber
systems.
The government's concept of engagement stresses the promo-
tion of voluntary public-private alliances to better secure cyber-
space. This theme of engagement predominates all of the federal
laws, executive orders, and presidential directives associated with
cyberspace. Although almost ten years old, a 2007 report issued
by the GAO is still relevant in its observation that government
and private sectors face a number of serious obstacles in promot-
ing cybersecurity, particularly in the context of an information
sharing environment between the government and the private
sector. 9 The most recent cybersecurity law enacted by Congress
was CISA, introduced on March 17, 2015 by Senator Richard
Burr (R-NC). ° CISA is another in a long line of efforts to en-
courage cooperative information-sharing initiatives between pri-
vate businesses and the government. The primary purpose of
CISA is "to improve cybersecurity in the United States through
enhanced sharing of information about cybersecurity threats, and
for other purposes."'" The major points include: (1) sharing cyber-
security information between private entities and the federal
government; (2) sharing unclassified cyber threat information
with the general public; and (3) having the federal government
share information regarding a cybersecurity threat that may af-
fect said entity to prevent or mitigate damages.92 Of particular
significance, the bill explicitly states that nothing in the act forces
a private entity to share information with the federal government
89. The four main categories of concern in the GAO Report focused on cyber crime, but
would also be equally pertinent in regards to any type of cyber-attack: (1) accurately re-
porting cyber crime to law enforcement; (2) "ensuring adequate law enforcement analytical
and technical capabilities[:] . . .obtaining and retaining investigators, prosecutors, and
[cyber forensics] examiners" and keeping up to date with current technology and criminal
techniques"; (3) "working in a borderless environment with laws of multiple jurisdictions"';
and (4) protecting information and information systems and raising awareness about crim-
inal behavior. Id.
90. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (1st Sess.
2015); S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 1, 16 (2015).
91. S. 754, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
92. Id.
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and there are no penalties for noncompliance.93 On the contrary,
CISA shields an entity from legal liability for sharing information
in accordance with CISA."4 The bill also recognizes the right of a
private entity to operate defensive measures to detect, prevent, or
mitigate cybersecurity threats.5
In June 2016, DHS and the Department of Justice issued guid-
ance related to CISA of 2015.6 Complete with charts, the guid-
ance document is meant to assist non-federal entities in how to
share cyber threat indicators and other defensive measures with
federal entities. The guidance document was written in response
to requests from the private sector to assist in navigating the
terms and definitions set out in CISA, as well as to explain more
clearly the legal protections afforded.
Critics of the government's engagement strategy argue that a
meaningful, cooperative, proactive, and reactive strategy between
the government and private industry is piecemeal. Even the more
immediate negative consequences to businesses caused by the
impact of cyber crime, which drains billions of dollars from con-
sumers and private industry each year, have not provided the
necessary incentive to produce stronger and more secure comput-
er networks. The basic reason for the lack of cooperation from
privately owned companies is understandable given the perennial
distrust of government coupled with the lack of desire for private-
ly owned companies to share information about security breaches.
First, private companies are concerned competitors might gain
access to exclusive company data that is shared with the govern-
ment through a public Freedom of Information Act (regardless of
assurances in CISA) request, or by means of other sources.97 Se-
cond, because the private sector operates in a competitive mar-
ket-based economy, public revelations regarding cybersecurity
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-
FEDERAL ENTITIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH
FEDERAL ENTITIES UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 (2016).
97. See Jeremy J. Broggi, Building on Executive Order 13,636 to Encourage Infor-
mation Sharing for Cybersecurity Purposes, 37 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 653, 657 (2014)
(discussing how programs aid cybersecurity work); Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cyber-
commons: Overcoming Fundamental Vulnerabilities to Critical Infrastructures in a Net-
worked World, 58 BUS. LAW 349, 375 (2002).
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breaches could have serious negative responses from both stock-
holders and consumers. For instance, if a bank acknowledges a
cyber breach that affects private account holders, the fear is that
those customers will withdraw their funds from the bank and
place them elsewhere. Under this light, in September 2016, the
tech giant Yahoo was reluctant to reveal that "information had
been stolen [via cyber attacks] on 500 million customer ac-
counts. '8
Unfortunately, it is a hard fact that very few private companies
have exhibited interest in exerting the cybersecurity efforts to the
degree that the government's engagement policy so strongly de-
sires. The frustration is that, without a cooperative effort to iden-
tify breaches and the possible weak points of cybersecurity sys-
tems, the vulnerabilities to cyber attack are magnified and
countermeasures remain far behind. For the time being, the gov-
ernment offers few driving incentives, such as the often over-
looked Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technolo-
gies Act (the "SAFETY Act"),99 to the private industry to work
together to better secure their cyber networks.
B. Federal Regulation and Private Business
In contrast to the lack of regulation in the private sector, gov-
ernment computers are directly subject to strict cybersecurity
standards set out in specific federal legislation mandating cyber
protective measures, such as the requirements found in the Fed-
98. Elizabeth Weise & Mike Snider, Yahoo's Massive, Hidden Email Search Would
Be First of its Kind, If Thue, USA TODAY (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
techlnews/2U16/lt)/04/yahoo-searched-customer-emails-nsa-report-fbi-reuters/91548012/.
99. See 6 U.S.C. §§ 101, 441-44 (2012). The SAFETY Act provides a legal liability
shield to designated anti-terrorism technologies thereby encouraging the adoption of inno-
vative technologies. Id. § 441. Under the terms of the SAFETY Act, "sellers" of a technolo-
gy that would "be effective in facilitating the defense against acts of terrorism, including
technologies that prevent defeat or respond to such acts" can petition the Secretary of
Homeland Security to designate such as a Qualified Anti-Terrorism Technology (QATT).
Id. Specifically, the sellers of "any product, equipment, service, device, or technology de-
signed, developed, modified, or procured for the specific purpose of preventing, detecting,
identifying, or deterring acts of terrorism" can apply for government certification from
DHS. Id. § 444. A cybersecurity technology that falls under the provisions of the act is cer-
tified as a QATT, which means that any liability actions regarding the use of the QATT
must be brought in a federal court. Id. § 442. The SAFETY Act also restricts the legal
claim to actual damages, removing punitive or exemplary damages from the claim. Id.
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eral Information Security Management Act of 2002.00 The term
standards is defined by the National Standards Policy Advisory
Committee as follows:
[Standards are] a prescribed set of rules, conditions, or requirements
concerning definitions of terms; classification of components; specifi-
cation of materials, performance, or operations; delineation of proce-
dures; or measurement of quantity and quality in describing materi-
als, products, systems, services, or practices.' ° I
While the government's demand for certain standards in its
own computers has spilled over to the private sector, it is certain-
ly the exception and not the rule. Exceptions to the government's
hands-off approach to regulating cyberspace are scattered
throughout various legislative initiatives aimed primarily at pro-
tecting P11. But apart from a few specific laws protecting PIT for
financial and health-related activities from disclosure, govern-
ment efforts to set cybersecurity standards or make private enti-
ties responsible for protecting their own computer systems are ra-
re. Examples of regulatory efforts include the following: the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 re-
quires certain private entities to establish cybersecurity programs
that protect health-related information in their possession; 102 the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20023 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999104 require corporate executives of publicly held companies to
annually certify the integrity of their financial reporting under
penaltyof fines or imprisonment;1 1 the Children's Online Privacy
100. The Federal Information Security Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 (2002). This act
was later updated in 2014 to become FISMA.
101. MAUREEN A. BREITENBERG, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, THE ABC's OF STANDARDS-
RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1987), http://gsi.nist.gov/global/docs/NB
SIR%2087-3576.pdf (citing Nat'l Standards Policy Advisory Committee, National Policy on
Standards in for the United States and a Recommended Implementation Plan 6 (1978)).
As suggested by its current engagement strategy, the federal government only promul-
gates cybersecurity standards for federal computer systems, except national security sys-
tems. The federal standards are developed by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology and set out as Federal Information Processing Standards ("FIPS"). FIPS are
promulgated under the simple rule-making procedures (notice and comment) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Standards regarding national security systems are developed
and controlled by the Committee on National Security Systems.
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1320d-2 (2012).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2012).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012).
105. See Lawrence A. Gordon et. al., Increasing Cybersecurity Investments In Private
Sector Firms, 1 J. CYBER SECURITY 3, 12 (2015); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act was passed in the wake of the accounting scandals at Enron and World-
Coin and helped spur a significant increase in cybersecurity.
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Protection Act of 1998106 requires protection of PII regarding chil-
dren; and the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") im-
poses regulations regarding cybersecurity standards for internal
financial controls.1 7
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is another entity that
seeks to push private industry to higher levels of cybersecurity
through enforcement actions. Under section 5 of the FTC Act, the
agency possesses a series of enforcement actions and consent de-
crees which extend cybersecurity obligations to certain private
industries by holding them responsible for privacy and security
promises they make to their customers.' Originally, the FTC fa-
cilitated cases based on the alleged failure by companies to pro-
vide adequate information security in compliance with represen-
tations they made to customers (i.e., deceptive trade practices
claims). In recent years, the FTC has significantly broadened the
scope of its enforcement authority by asserting that a failure to
provide appropriate information security was, itself, an unfair
trade practice-even in the absence of any false representations
by the defendant as to the adequacy of its security.0 9 For in-
stance, in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, the federal
district court found that the FTC did possess the power to assert
unfair and deceptive trade practice claims against Wyndham for
causing substantial consumer injury by unreasonably and unnec-
essarily failing to notify customers or take corrective measures to
halt cyber hacks on customer's PII." °
A variety of federal and state E-transaction laws, such as the
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-
SIGN") and the Uniform Electronic Transmissions Act ("UETA"),
now require all companies to provide cybersecurity for the storage
of electronic records relating to online transactions."1 In addition,
sector-specific regulations are experiencing proliferation. This in-
106. 15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2012).
107. See 79 Fed. Reg. 72252 (Dec. 5, 2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240, 242, 249
(2016)).
108. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
109. 16 C.F.R. § 682.3 (2016); see, e.g., Hendricks v. DSW Shoe Warehouse, Inc., 444 F.
Supp. 2d 775, 777-78 (W.D. Mich. 2006) (complaint alleging shoe retailer failed to provide
reasonable and appropriate security for its customers P11).
110. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 607 (D.N.J. 2014).
111. See Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7001
(2012); UNIF. ELEC. TRANSMISSIONS ACT (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1999) (enacted in all states,
except Illinois, New York, and Washington).
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cludes the Internal Revenue Service's requirement for companies
to implement information cybersecurity to protect electronic tax
records112 and SEC regulations requiring cybersecurity as a condi-
tion to engage in certain E1-transactions.13 The Food and Drug
Administration also has regulations requiring improved cyberse-
curity for certain types of records." 4
In examining the government's attempt to enforce greater
cyber standards on the private sector, it is important to note that
the federal government is significantly involved in prosecuting
cyber breaches when they do occur. While numerous federal stat-
utes address cybercrimes,115 the primary and most comprehensive
statute is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") passed in
1986.116 The CFAA has been amended many times to include vari-
ous new provisions found in the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (the "USA PATRIOT Act").1 7
In short, the CFAA makes it a federal crime to gain unauthorized
access to, damage, or use certain "protected" computers and com-
puter systems illegally.' The term "protected" sounds limited but
is actually construed quite broadly and applies to practically eve-
ry computer in the world, including those computer systems used
by the nation's financial institutions, by federal government enti-
ties, or in interstate and foreign commerce." 9 As one commentator
succinctly put it, it is enough if the computer is "connected to the
Internet.""' The only exemptions pertain to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies when performing their official duties. 2' Cu-
112. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1441-1(e)(4)(iv)(B) (2016).
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13n-6 (2016).
114. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.63 (2016).
115. Some federal statutes address such things as: illegal wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343
(2012); aggravated identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2012); fraud in connection with iden-
tification documents, and authentication features and information, 18 U.S.C. § 1028
(2012); intentional interference with computer-related systems used in interstate com-
merce, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012); deceptive practices affecting commerce, 15 U.S.C. §
45(a)(1) (2012); and installing "sniffer" software to record keystroke and computer traffic,
18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2012).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
117. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
119. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
120. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 97-105, CYBERCRIME: AN OVERVIEW
OF THE FEDERAL COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE STATUTE AND RELATED FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS 61 n.330 (2014).
121. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(f).
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riously, military personnel are not exempted-neither from the
criminal penalties of the CFAA nor from any subsequent civil ac-
tion against them personally.'22
In terms of motivating the private sector to improve cybersecu-
rity, CFAA does provide some interesting statutory provisions. In
addition to addressing acts of trafficking in passwords, espionage,
fraud, and damage caused by viruses, worms, or other devices, 2'
the CFAA sets out criminal penalties ranging from imprisonment
for not more than a year for- simple violations, to life imprison-
ment for intentional acts resulting in death. Furthermore, the
CFAA creates a separate civil cause of action for any person who
suffers loss or damage due to a violation. Victims can file suit
against "any individual, firm, corporation, educational institu-
tion, governmental entity, or legal or other entity.""' 4 Section
1030(g) states:
Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of
this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.
A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if the
conduct involves one of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II),
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i). Damages for a violation in-
volving only conduct described in subsection (c)(4)(A)(i)(I) are limited
to economic damages. No action may be brought under this subsec-
tion unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act
complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage. No action
may be brought under this subsection for the negligent design or
manufacture of computer hardware, computer software, or firm-
125
ware.
122. See Molly Picard, Comment, Cyberspace: The 21st Century Battlefield Exposing
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines to Potential Civil Liabilities, 4 NAT'L SECURITY
L.J. 125, 129 (2015).
123. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a). The seven areas of interest in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) include:
computer trespassing, e.g., hacking, associated with a government computer, § 1030(a)(3);
computer trespassing resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or
commercial information, § 1030(a)(2); damaging either a government computer, a bank
computer, or a computer that is used in interstate or foreign commerce, § 1030(a)(5); com-
mitting fraud where an integral part involves unauthorized access to a government com-
puter, a bank computer, or a computer used in interstate or foreign commerce, §
1030(a)(4); threatening to damage a government computer, a bank computer, or a comput-
er used in interstate or foreign commerce, § 1030(a)(7); trafficking in passwords used for a
government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in interstate or foreign com-
merce, § 1030(a)(6); and accessing a computer to commit espionage, § 1030(a)(1).
124. DOYLE, supra note 120, at 24.
125. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012).
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C. State Efforts to Enhance Cybersecurity
Individual states have also enacted laws associated with cyber-
security concerns. These laws address a wide range of issues, in-
cluding cutting off public access to open government records, im-
proving security measures for wireless networks, criminalizing
the installation of software on another's computer which is then
used in deceptive methods, requiring businesses to report loss of
P11, and even requiring certain businesses to develop reasonable
cybersecurity to protect PII.126 Without question, the item of
greatest interest is the requirement that certain businesses im-
plement reasonable cybersecurity standards to protect P1.
127
Such state laws are generally known as security breach laws. In
2003, California enacted the California Database Protection Act
("CDPA"), becoming the first state in the United States to pass
legislation requiring any government or private entity possessing
PII to notify the owners in the event of a disclosure of PIH to an
unauthorized person resulting from a security breach. 2 ' Addi-
tionally, the CDPA placed an unprecedented statutory duty on
businesses that own or authorize the use of PII to "implement
and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices ap-
propriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal
information from unauthorized access, destruction, use, modifica-
tion, or disclosure.' 29 California's approach has served as a model
for similar statutes in dozens of other states. As of January 2016,
at least forty-seven states now require businesses to notify their
customers or clients if there is a security breach involving PII."'°
These state laws generally apply to any business maintaining PII
of its residents.
For instance, in 2005, the Texas legislature passed Senate Bill
122, which amended the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and
126. See generally STATE OPEN GOVERNMENT LAW AND PRACTICE IN A POST-9/11
WORLD, (Jeffrey F. Addicott, Loren A. Cochran, Lucy A. Dalglish & Nathan Winegar eds.,
2007) (suggesting some fear that terrorists could use open government laws to hack into
government facilities, which has prompted at least forty-eight of them to add non-release
provisions to their open government laws).
127. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2016), amended by 2016 Cal. Stat. 96 (A.B. 2828).
129. Id. § 1798.81.5(b).
130. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/re
search/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-ntiication-laws.
aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2017).
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the Texas Business and Commerce Code.'31 The relevant portion
of the Texas Business and Commerce Code reads:
A business shall implement and maintain reasonable procedures, in-
cluding taking any appropriate corrective action, to protect and safe-
guard from unlawful use or disclosure any sensitive personal infor-
mation collected or maintained by the business in the regular course
of business.' 32
Like the approach in California, the Texas legislature statuto-
rily defined that businesses within the state of Texas owe a duty
to their customers to implement reasonable procedures to safe-
guard PII. Section 521.053 of the Texas Business & Commerce
Code provides:
Any person who maintains computerized data that includes sensitive
personal information not owned by the person shall notify the owner
or license holder of the information of any breach of system security
immediately after discovering the breach, if the sensitive personal
information was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by
an unauthorized person [emphasis added]."'
D. Asleep at the Vheel
Considering that ninety percent of cyber attacks target the pri-
vate sector, it is evident that relying on voluntary engagement
practices to protect America's critical infrastructure is inade-
quate. There can be absolutely no question that the threat of a
significant cyber attack on the nation's critical infrastructure is a
grave concern. In turn, there can be absolutely no question that,
because of this potential for societal catastrophe, protecting cy-
berspace has passed into the realm of a societal "commons" in
which the government is obligated to exert greater protection
131. S.B. 122, 79th Leg., ch. 294, § 1(a) (codified at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
2.29 (West 2005)).
132. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 48.102(a) (2006).
133. Id. § 48.103(c) (2006). The law defines sensitive personal data at:
Subsection (b), an individual's first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following items, if the names and
the items are not encrypted:
(A) social security number;
(B) driver's license number or government-issued identification number; or
account number or credit or debit card number in combination with any re-
quired security code, access code, or password that would permit access to an
individual's financial account.
Id. § 48.002(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
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than it has over the past thirty years.' In other words, the seri-
ous threat posed by a cyber attack on our critical infrastructure-
including massive human casualties, wide-scale economic dam-
age, wide-scale disruption to public order, and significant disrup-
tion of America's national readiness for war-indicates that the
government has a duty to provide meaningful protection for the
common good. From this perspective, many question the efficacy
of any federal approach to secure cyberspace that fails to incorpo-
rate, or adequately motivate private industry to incorporate, the
highest degree of cybersecurity.
Because it is impossible to immediately determine the precise
source of a cyber attack-it could be an amateur, a terrorist, a
criminal, or even a hostile nation-state-the so-called "response
baton" will originate with the private sector and then may be
passed to law enforcement and next, perhaps, to the military. Re-
alistically, a commons-oriented cybersecurity strategy would in-
volve two key elements: (1) a program that requires the sharing
of timely and accurate information all along the continuum, from
private to government; and (2) the adoption of industry-specific
cybersecurity standards and a corresponding process of certifica-
tion.
Amazingly, despite lip service to the massive damage that could
be caused by a significant cyber attack on the nation's critical in-
frastructure, the Obama administration's 2015 National Security
Strategy ("NSS") not only placed "confront climate change" above
the far more dangerous threat to American security posed by
cyber attacks, the 2015 NSS also characterized America's primary
cyber concerns as needing to "ensure access to shared spaces" such
as "cyberspace" with other nations!
13 5
With such absurd leadership signals about cyber priorities for
the nation, it is not unreasonable to question whether the gov-
ernment is too complacent in terms of advancing cybersecurity
concerns. Neither is it unreasonable to suspect this is a film we
have seen before in terms of how the government has failed to an-
ticipate and take concrete steps to protect Americans from harm
134. See, e.g., Roger Hurwitz, Depleted Trust in the Cyber Commons, STRATEGIC
STUDIES QuAR., Fall 2012 (describing steps nations must take to ensure the survival of the
internet as a "commons resource").
135. THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 12 (2015).
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in the physical world-most notably, from the radical Islamic ter-
ror attacks of 9/11 against the United States.136 In the wake of 9/
11, Congress authorized a bipartisan group to make findings and
recommendations about what happened and why. 117 In terms of
government preparedness, the 9/11 Commission produced a
lengthy document that described American intelligence and law
enforcement agencies' failure to anticipate and deal with the
threat of the al Qaeda terror group"' as a "failure of imagina-
tion."'39 The American government did not seriously consider the
real possibility of an al Qaeda terror attack using commercial air-
lines as precision weapons. Consequently, the United States was
caught completely by surprise, resulting in the violent deaths of
3000 humans and the loss of billions of dollars in property. 4 ' It is
reasonable to ask if this "failure of imagination" pertaining to 9/
11 will repeat itself in the cyber world due to the government's
haphazard approach to cybersecurity.
136. Evan Thomas, A New Date of Infamy, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.
newsweek.com/new-date-infamy-151751 (setting out a timeline of events that occurred on
Sept. 11, 2001). Identification of the source(s) of a cyber-attack, including the Internet Pro-
tocol ("IP") address of the attacker, is vital to the identification of the attacker, the de-
ployment of effective countermeasures and the development of new cyber security defense
tools. An automated process of tracing the source(s) of a DDoS attack is known as "IP
Traceback." Of course, IP Traceback opens up its own area of liability and privacy issues
associated offensive cybersecurity actions. Id.
137. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
https://www.9-Ilcommission.gov (last modified Sept. 20 2004); see NAT'L COMM'N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 1-46 (2004)
(setting out a final analysis by the United States government of all the issues associated
with the 9/11 attacks by al Qaeda). On September 11, 2001, nineteen members of the radi-
cal Islamic terror group named al Qaeda hijacked four United States passenger aircrafts
while in flight (five terrorists each in three planes and four in the fourth that went down
in Pennsylvania). The al Qaeda foot soldiers intentionally crashed two of the aircraft into
the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. A third aircraft targeted
the Pentagon in northern Virginia. The fourth plane, United 93, went down in a field in
Pennsylvania, most likely because of the heroic efforts of some of the passengers who
stormed the al Qaeda pilots. Id.
138. The key declaration of war from the perspective of the radical Islamic group was
made on February 22, 1998, when Osama bin Laden and the 'World Islamic Front" for-
mally issued a religious fatwa urging all Muslims to engage in physical violence against
"Crusaders and Jews." PETER L. BERGEN, THE OSAMA BIN LADEN I KNOW 196 (2006).
139. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 336 (2004).
140. Tom Templeton & Tom Lumley, 9/11 in Numbers, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2002),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/aug/18/usa.terrorism.
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V. CYBER CIVIL LIABILITY LAWSUITS
"[Ifn the data-security context, 'reasonableness is the touch-
stone. ,1,14
-FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.
As noted in Part IV, the government's understated theme of
engagement continues to place emphasis on user privacy and
cyber system integrity.' As a result, the matter of cybersecurity
in general-particularly in terms of setting viable security stand-
ards-is left in the hands of civilian technology developers, manu-
facturers, and owner/operators.
If the government's engagement strategy does not adequately
alter business practices, change can come from market pressures
and consumer desires. At the forefront of most internet users'
minds is the question of privacy.'43 As they venture online, users
and consumers look for reassurance that the PH1 they submit will
remain protected by their own computer, their Internet Service
Provider ("ISP"), and the website they are visiting. Conversely,
the chief concern of technology developers, manufacturers, and
owner/operators is making a profit.
Still, the need to provide a service or product in a competitive
marketplace can [or "lead to"] cause positive changes. For exam-
ple, recognizing that users of electronic devices-from handheld
mobile devices to desktop computers-demand concrete assur-
ances that their privacy is fully protected when they are engaging
in various online activities such as shopping, communicating with
others, or banking, the $120 billion"' industry has made encryp-
141. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 616 (D.N.J. 2014),
aff-d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). The Federal Trade Commission filed unfair and decep-
tive practices when Wyndham failed to take appropriate steps following a cyber-attack. Id.
142. See NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL & HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, CYBERSPACE POLICY
REVIEW, ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE i (2009).
143. See generally NAT'L SEC. COUNCIL & HOMELAND SEC. COUNCIL, CYBERSPACE
POLICY REVIEW, ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE i (2009); David Inserra & Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity Information
Sharing: One Step Toward U.S. Security, Prosperity, and Freedom in Cyberspace,
HERITAGE FOUND., (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/04/cyber
security-information-sharing-one-step-toward-us-security-prosperity-and-freedom-in-cyber
space.
144. See JONATHAN GODFREY ET AL., ACT, STATE OF THE APP ECONOMY 4 (2016).
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tion145 a cornerstone element of business. To combat the omni-
present threat of cyber attacks, corporations around the globe
have spent an estimated $75 billion in 2015 and are predicted to
shell out an incredible $90 billion by 2017.146 But is this enough?
Numerous public and private studies have offered various pro-
posals for implementing sound security practices to ensure great-
er cybersecurity, particularly when it comes to critical infrastruc-
ture systems. However, a Congressional Research Service report
correctly observed that none of them are "likely to be widely
adopted in the absence of sufficient economic incentives for cyber-
security." '147 In other words, what is needed is a cyber version of
the Connie Francis lawsuit where the affected plaintiff(s) are able
to show significant physical loss, and the associated recovery is
large enough to then motivate massive cybersecurity improve-
ments across the board.
Liability issues associated with breaches of computer security
rubricate cyber discussions from ISPs and other private compa-
nies, even if little is being done to rectify those concerns. As ex-
plained in Part I, civil action lawsuits for failure to protect cus-
tomers from cyber attacks will soon find their way into court as
tort or product liability claims. '
Liability under tort law requires that the defendant breached a
legal duty to exercise a level of care imposed by either statute or
common law. In terms of developing a reasonableness test for the
level of cybersecurity owed, judges will no doubt give great con-
sideration to the developing legal standards for information secu-
145. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 2, App Ass'n in Support of Apple Inc.'s Motion to Vacate
Order Compelling Assistance, In re Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execu-
tion of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, No. 5:16-
CM-0001-SP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2016). "[Encryption] provides the transaction security
that allows companies to sell globally and provides security for much of the nation's com-
merce, and ensures that our most sensitive data stays private-protecting patient health
information, financial data, and every American who shops online." Id.
146. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 9, AVG Technologies, The Computer & Commc'ns Ind.
Ass'n, Data Foundry, Golden Frog, The Internet Ass'n, and the Internet Infrastructure
Coal. in Support of Apple Inc.'s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search, and Opposition to Government's Motion to Compel Assistance, In re
Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black
Lexus IS300, Cal. License Plate 35KGD203, at 2, No. 5:16-CM-00010-SP (C.D. Cal. Mar.
22, 2016).
147. FISCHER, NATIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 69, at ii.
148. See Nigel Pearson, A Larger Problem: Financial and Reputational Risks,
COMPUTER FRAUD & SECURITY, Apr. 2014, at 11, 13.
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rity, which in this case would be discovered by reviewing industry
trends in the area of cybersecurity. The legal obligation to imple-
ment adequate cybersecurity measures can be classified as either
industry-specific, data-specific, or focused on public companies. 4 '
At a minimum, there exists at least a general obligation to pro-
vide some level of cybersecurity. Specifically, legal obligations for
technology developers, manufacturers, and owner/operators re-
garding information security derive from multiple sources: enact-
ed federal and state laws, regulations and government enforce-
ment actions, and common law fiduciary duties and obligations to
provide reasonable care.
What, then, is considered reasonable care in the context of cy-
bersecurity protection? One could argue that the very fact a secu-
rity breach occurs is a breach of a common law duty owed by the
ISP or a commercial firm to provide reasonable security for its
customers' P11. But the more likely approach is to look at indus-
try standards. 5 ' In fact, various cyberspace arenas have devel-
oped a number of standards, best practices, and guidelines. While
adherence to an existing industry standard is not dispositive to
the determination of reasonable care owed, it is relevant. Still, as
in the Connie Francis case, any given court can choose to ignore
industry standards and determine that "reasonable care" de-
manded a higher level of duty."'
149. Thomas J. Smedinghoff, It's All About Trust: The Expanding Scope of Security Ob-
ligations in Global Privacy and E-Transactions Law, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (2007);
see also Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self Defense and De-
terrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 433, 498-99 (2012); supra note 136.
150. See Tim Goles & Sandra G. Dykes, Legal Perspectives on Distributed Denial of
Service Attack Traceback: A Fresh Approach, 6TH ANNUAL SECURITY CONF. 31-11 (Apr. 11-
12, 2007), http://www.isy.vcu.edu/-gdhillon/Old2/secconf/secconfO7/PDFs/31.pdf; see also
Kesan & Hayes, supra note 149, at 433, 498-99.
151. See Meiring de Villiers, Enabling Technologies of Cyber Crime: Why Lawyers Need
to Understand It, 11 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y, 1, 41 (2011). Another topic of discussion in
terms of potential liability revolves around the interconnectivity of cyberspace and the
idea that liability might be extended to other tortfeasors who may have contributed to the
cyber-attack due to sloppy cybersecurity measures. Thus, an emerging negligence theory
entitled the Encourage Free Radicals ("EFR") doctrine, extends the liability of an original
tortfeasor to a second tortfeasor if it is found that the lax lever of cybersecurity measures
encouraged the attacks of "free radicals." Id. Mark Grady, the originator of the doctrine,
describes free radicals as "those individuals who are shielded from liability by anonymity,
insufficient assets, lack of mental capacity, or lack of good judgment." Meiring de Villiers,
Free Radicals in Cyberspace: Complex Liability Issues in Information Warfare, 4 NW. J.
TECH & INTELL. PROP. 13, 16 (2005). For instance, cyber criminals might fit the description
of free radicals because they are judgment-proof, elusive, and protected by anonymity. The
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In the interim-until a huge Connie Francis-styled cyber law-
suit takes place perhaps some movement forward can originate in
the form of class action lawsuits over cyber breaches that result
in the release of P11. Previously, one of the greatest legal hurdles
in these class actions is the showing of injury in fact.
In 2014, two Ninth Circuit court decisions signified positive
change in terms of satisfying the plaintiffs standing for an injury
in fact when customer's PII was released due to a data breach by
hackers. In both cases, the companies failed to take timely action
to notify customers of the breach. In both cases-In re Sony Gam-
ing Networks & Customer Data Security Breach"..and In re Adobe
Systems Privacy Litigation153 the courts found the plaintiffs al-
leged a credible threat of harm based on the fact that their P11
was released. In a class action suit against the retail giant Tar-
get, filed after a cyber attack resulted in the loss of 110 million
customer's PII, the "[p]laintiffs contend[ed] that Target violat-
ed ... consumer protection laws in several ways," including: "fail-
ing to maintain adequate computer systems and data security
practices."'54
CONCLUSION
"We must defend and protect federal networks and data... [w]e
operate these networks on behalf of the American people and they
are very important and very sacred."''
-President Donald J. Trump
It was American businessmen who developed the technological
advances that opened up the unfathomable marvels of cyberspace
and, by so doing, spawned a modern world that is now completely
dependent on cyber, particularly in the context of sustaining and
second factor necessary for applying the EFR doctrine is that the tortfeasor's encourage-
ment of the free radical constituted negligent behavior.
152. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d
942, 954-55 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
153. In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1206-07 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
154. In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1157, 1161-62 (D.
Minn. 2014).
155. President Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Meeting of Cybersecurity Experts at
the White House (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4653944/rudy-giuliani-
president-trump-keith-alexander.
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operating our critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, if a given
SCADA succumbs to a cyber attack, it could cripple a critical in-
frastructure and cause tremendous harm, including mass human
casualties. The cyber attack might devastate electric utilities;
chemical, gas, and oil refineries; public transportation; or hospital
services. And there is currently no Plan B.
Since SCADA systems are designed for efficiency, not security,
making them safe and secure is further frustrated by the absence
of a strong federal strategy that mandates information sharing
and effective cybersecurity standards. In addition, the widespread
technical ignorance of security managers and the false sense of
security due to the absence of a major cyber attack on America's
infrastructure contribute to the vulnerability equation.
Partnering the private industry with the government to secure
cyberspace is in its infancy, but given the fact that protecting the
critical infrastructure as a societal "commons" is a responsibility
of the government, eventually the government may be forced to
implement programs to ensure the private industry shares cyber-
security information and develops proper cybersecurity measures.
Unfortunately, the complacent habit of dealing only with realized
threats has not imparted a sense of urgency that will ultimately
be necessary to protect the cyber world and make it as safe a
place as the physical world.
At the end of the day, neither private industry nor the govern-
ment can defend the SCADA systems of the nation's critical in-
frastructure alone. Still, the larger burden will always fall upon
the shoulders of private industry. Until the Connie Francis-styled
cyber case occurs, the issue of tort liability and improved cyberse-
curity requirements will continue to bubble below the surface.5 '
But like a volcano, it will one day erupt. The hope is that the im-
petus that propels the lawsuit, which will ignite the movement
toward greater levels of cybersecurity, will be smaller in terms of
sustained damage.
156. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Lia-
bility, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 311 (2005).
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